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EXPERT WITNESSES-RIGHT TO PAY EXPERT
WITNESSES ON A CONTINGENT-FEE BASIS IN
CIVIL CASES
The inability of many Americans to finance the cost of neces-
sary legal services presents an ever-growing problem.1 Attorney
fees, witness fees, filing fees, and discovery costs cut substantially
into the resources of private plaintiffs. These high costs may pre-
vent the litigation of some meritorious claims where a potential
litigant decides that the possibility of a successful complaint or
defense on the merits is outweighed by the price of a lawsuit.2 This
financial impediment to the pursuit of a legal remedy, however, is
only burdensome for those unable to bear the high costs.
Although the client must generally finance the cost of the
litigation regardless of the outcome, 3 the legislatures, the courts,
and the legal profession have responded to the challenge of unequal
access to the judicial process and have established exceptions to
the general rule. In criminal cases, the duty to finance legal serv-
ices for indigent defendants is imposed upon the states,4 and in
civil cases, where damages often take the form of money, the courts
avoid the issue of right to counsel by condoning the retention of
attorneys on a contingent-fee basis.5 In some instances, Congress
has shifted attorney fees' and witness fees7 to the losing party.
State legislatures have provided for proceedings in forma
pauperis,I and where such statutes have been held to be inapplica-
I McCourt, Professional Responsibility-Cost Barriers to the Delivery of Legal
Services, 1974-75 ANN. SURVEy AM. L. 531 (1975).
2 Cf. 6 MooRE's FERAL PRAcTIcE 54.71[3] (2d ed. 1976) (employment of
expert witnesses in antitrust actions).
3 Tunney, Foreward Financing the Cost of Enforcing Legal Rights, 122 U. PA.
L. Rav. 632, 637 (1974).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
HARv. L. Rav. 435, 451 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 81 HARV. L. REv. 435].
1 See, e.g., Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Truth in Lending Act, §
130(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, § 16(b), 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). For a more extensive listing, see 6 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE 54.71[2] (2d ed. 1976).
See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-2(d)
(Supp. 1977); Noise Control Act, § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (Supp. V 1975).
Under present case law, however, judicial interpretation of the Clayton Act does
not award expert witness' fees to a successful plaintiff. 6 MooRE's FEzRAL PRA~ricE
54.71[3], at 1386 (2d ed. 1976).
8 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1101 (McKinney 1976); W. VA. CoDE § 59-
1-36 (1966).
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ble to review proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has
waived filing fees, although nominal, for indigent parties.' Even
discovery costs are sometimes shifted to the other party.'0
With respect to witness fees, however, the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Code of Professional Responsibility increases the cost bar-
riers between litigants and courts by forbidding attorneys to "offer
to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness
contingent upon. . . the outcome of the case."" This is especially
important in cases where expert witnesses are employed because
they may be and usually are paid an amount in excess of the
nominal statutory allowance paid to ordinary witnesses.'2 The pro-
hibition on paying expert witnesses a contingent fee has been criti-
cized as a denial of equal access to the courts.'3
Modern courtroom practice relies on qualified" expert wit-
nesses to establish facts beyond the knowledge of the ordinary
layman'5 where the testimony "might aid the jury."" In criminal
I See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied without payment of $4 filing fee); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
(motion for leave to appeal denied without payment of $20 filing fee).
," Where the party giving notice of the taking of a deposition fails to attend or
fails to subpoena the witness, he must pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred by the attending party. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(g). Where the
court grants a motion for an order compelling discovery, the nonmoving party pays
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the moving party,
but where the court denies the motion, the moving party pays the nonmoving party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Where a party refuses to admit the truth of any matter as
requested, and the requesting party proves the truth of the matter, the refusing
party pays the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the re-
questing party. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c). Where a party fails to attend at his own
deposition, to serve answers to interrogatories or to respond to requests for inspec-
tion, he pays the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees. FED. R. Civ. P.
37(d).
"ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPoNsmrzn DR 7-109(c).
" 50 Op. Att'y. Gen. 72 (1962). Ordinary witnesses are allowed not less than
ten nor more than twenty dollars per day, W. VA. CODE § 59-1-16 (Cum. Supp.
1977), but expert witnesses are sometimes paid enormous sums of money, Trans
World Airlines v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971) (expert witness fees totaled
$1,642,677.71). It is important to note that expert witnesses are paid for their
services in preparation of trial and not for their testimony.
'1 Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), reu'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293 (Nov. 1,
1977).
"1 Lester v. Rose, 147 W. Va. 575, 595, 130 S.E.2d 80, 94 (1963).
'3 Compare Ames & Webb, Inc. v. Commercial Laundry Co., 204 Va. 616, 133
S.E.2d 547 (1963) (expert allowed where question of excavation requirements in
2
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cases, the government "spend[s] vast sums of money to establish
machinery in order to try defendants."' 7 Both prosecution and de-
fense attorneys bolster their arguments with the testimony of doc-
tors, fingerprint experts, narcotics experts, handwriting experts,
ballistic experts, and psychiatrists.'8 In civil cases, the successful
litigation of antitrust, malpractice, products liability, patent,
copyright, personal injury, desegregation, and obscenity claims,
for example, requires the use of expert witnesses.'" Corporate de-
fendants in civil cases have an arsenal of experts in their own
employees. The federal courts' and legislatures' sanction of the use
of expert testimony" further reflects the widespread belief in the
necessity of expert witnesses.
Although few would contest the necessity of expert witnesses
in a highly specialized society, opinion differs on whether a parti-
san or an impartial expert witness system would best cope with
this need. In the former, each party pays his expert,2' but in the
latter, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that the parties shall
share the expert's fees." Criticism of the present partisan expert
system focuses on two aspects. First, experience shows that parties
search until they find the "best witness" who supports their posi-
tion.2 Master of the Rolls Jessel wrote,
[Tihe mode in which expert evidence is obtained is such as not
to give the fair result of scientific opinion to the Court. A man
may go, and does sometimes to half-a-dozen experts. . . . He
takes their honest opinions, he finds three in his favor and three
against him; he says to the three in his favor, Will you be kind
sandy soil) with Collins v. Zedeker, 421 Pa. 52, 218 A.2d 776 (1966) (expert not
allowed where question is how a person walks).
18 Currier v. Grossman's, Inc., 107 N.H. 159, 161, 219 A.2d 273, 275 (1966).
, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
" C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMCK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 206 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRmCK].
" Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144, 146
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293
(Nov. 1, 1977).
2 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow the court to call expert wit.
nesses, and in the case of indigent defendants, the government must finance the
cost. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b), 28. For application of Rule 17, see Bandy v. United
States, 296 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1961) (government will provide handwriting expert
for indigent defendant if defendant complies with rule). For discovery rules sanc-
tioning the use of expert witnesses, see note 10 supra.
21 See note 3 supra.
2 FED. R. EvID. 706(b).
' MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 17, at 38.
[Vol. 80
3
Lea: Expert Witnesses--Right to Pay Expert Witnesses on a Contingent-F
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1978
EXPERT WITNESSES
enough to give evidence? and he pays the three against him
their fees and leaves them alone; the other side does the same
... I am sorry to say the result is that the Court does not get
that assistance from the experts which, if they were unbiased
and fairly chosen, it would have a right to expect.
2'
Only the well-to-do can afford to hire the ideal witness whose
background, experience, demeanor, ability to communicate, and
testimony will most impress a jury.2 Second, cross-examination
does not always adequately present expert testimony to a jury.26 To
remedy the first criticism, judges may, in their inherent power27 or
rule-given power,2 call expert witnesses. In cases involving medi-
cal testimony, more and more courts call experts from impartial
panels."0 In response to the second criticism regarding the best
manner in which to elicit expert testimony, France has adopted a
system in which the expert, rather than testifying, prepares a re-
port in answer to a court order.30 If the court exercises its discretion
and calls the witness, then the judge, not the attorney, questions
the expert.31 These two. criticisms of the partisan expert system,
however, would only be magnified by endorsement of the right to
retain expert witnesses on a contingent-fee basis because such en-
dorsement would make it economically feasible for more parties to
retain expert witnesses. The partisan expert system also imposes
a greater financial burden on each party than does the impartial
expert system.
The latter system would eliminate the problem of forum shop-
ping and would provide neutral experts to testify before the jury.
An impartial expert witness system, of course, is not wholly free
24 Plimpton v. Spiller, 6 Ch. D. 412, 415 n.2 (1877).
2 2 AM. JuR. TRA L Selecting and Preparing Expert Witnesses § § 19-24 (1964).
' McCoRMICK, supra note 16, § 17, at 38. For difficulties encountered in ex-
plaining medical testimony, see Guttmacher, Problems Faced By the Impartial
Expert Witness in Court: The American View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 369, 369-70 (1961).
2 31 AM. JuR.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 8 (1967).
2 FED. R. Evm. 706.
" For a discussion of the pros and cons of impartial panels of medical experts,
see Guttmacher, Problems Faced By the Impartial Expert Witness in Court: The
American View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 369 (1961); Polsky, Expert Testimony: Problems in
Jurisprudence, 34 TnmP. L.Q. 357 (1961); Schroeder, Problems Faced by the Impar-
tial Expert Witness in Court: The Continental View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 378 (1961); Van
Dusen, The Impartial Medical Expert System: The Judicial Point of View, 34
TEmp. L.Q. 386 (1961).
10 Travis, Impartial Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence:
A French Perspective, 8 INT'L L. 492, 503-04 (1974).
31 Id.
4
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from problems either. There, one confronts the question of what
weight to give to the impartial expert's testimony in relation to
that given the partisan expert.2 Beyond the commentators' writ-
ten protestations and the rule allowing, but not mandating, the
judge to call expert witnesses, no marked trend away from the
partisan witness system has materialized.
Because a need for expert witnesses exists and the system of
partisan witnesses remains a significant part of American trial
practice, fairness demands that the opposing party, who also bears
part of the responsibility of finding and presenting evidence, have
the opportunity to rebut the "hired gun's" testimony with other
expert testimony. In order to discover the truth in every lawsuit by
way of the adversary system, the parties must have relatively equal
resources.3 3 The contingent-fee arrangement would provide a
practical means by which the poor and persons of moderate means
could pay for expert witness' services in the same manner as they
presently may pay for attorneys' services. The judgment award
provides a res out of which to pay expert witnesses.35 Also, wit-
nesses, who are required to be away from their homes and their
occupations, require compensation in order to meet the cost of
living. Perhaps the best reason for allowing the contingent-fee
contract is that, while witnesses are now paid a fixed fee in theory,
they are paid on a contingent-fee basis in reality because the ex-
pert often goes unpaid when the employing party loses. Even if
the expert successfully sues the losing party to recover his fee,
there is little or no res from which he could collect.
In contrast to the reasons offered for allowing the retention of
expert witnesses on a contingent-fee basis, there are reasons for
prohibiting it. Since the expert witness receives compensation only
if his party wins, he has a more obvious financial interest in the
lawsuit. Perhaps he will compromise his public duty by lying or by
32 Travis, Impartial Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence:
A French Perspective, 8 Int'l L. 492, 519 (1974).
33 Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity
Defense, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 1061, 1062-63 (1962).
1' ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIIATY EC 2-20.
35 Id.
'$ Cf. Arlidge, Contingent Fees, 6 OrTAWA L. REy. 374, 394 (1974) (arguments
in favor of allowing contingent fees for lawyers).
41 Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144, 146
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W.
3293 (Nov. 1, 1977).
[Vol. 80
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exaggerating the facts.3 But at the same time any payment pro-
vides such incentive.39 Any financial interest, however nominal,
makes a witness susceptible to impeachment, but a contingent fee
is usually larger than a fixed fee and would expose the witness'
credibility to a more devastating impeachment on grounds of bias
by the cross-examiner.4 Perhaps, if the party paying the contin-
gent fee were to testify that he was unable to hire the expert on a
fixed fee, his testimony would alleviate the impact of impeach-
ment. The client would have to choose whether to forego the ex-
pert's testimony and possibly even the lawsuit or whether to as-
sume this risk.
Even if the law allowed retention of expert witnesses on a
contingent-fee basis in civil cases, the problems inherent in such
an arrangement necessitate safeguards. These could be similar to
the safeguards now imposed upon the contingent-fee payment of
lawyers. First, the courts could hold the attorney responsible for
arranging the terms of the contingent fee between his client and
the expert in order to avoid subsequent misunderstandings and to
promote good relations among attorney, client, and expert.42 Sec-
ond, the contingent fee could not be illegal or clearly excessive,43
and the reasonableness of the fee would be subject to judicial and
professional scrutiny.44 And finally, the contingent fee would not
be applicable in criminal cases because the proceedings "do not
produce a res with which to pay the fee.
' '45
A stronger argument for allowing expert witnesses to be paid
on a contingent-fee basis would be possible if the right to have an
expert witness testify were constitutionally based. This issue has
been presented to the United States Supreme Court in two crimi-
nal cases. In United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi,4 the Court af-
firmed a lower court decision which held that where the court has
11 Cf. Arlidge, Contingent Fees, 6 OTTAWA L. Rav. 374, 394 (1974) (arguments
against allowing contingent fees for lawyers).
31 Person v. Association of Bar of City of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144, 146
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293
(Nov. 1, 1977).
Campbell Co. v. Howard, 133 Va. 19, 112 S.E. 876, 885 (1922).
" MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 40 n.9.
42 Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrry EC 2-19 (attorney's agree-
ment with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made).
a Id. DR 2-106(A).
" Arlidge, Contingent Fees, 6 OTAWA L. REV. 374, 396 (1974).
"ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsiBmIrY EC 2-20.
192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951), affl'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
6
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called an expert witness the defendant has no constitutional right
to his expert at state expense because his rights have been pro-
tected. The Court next faced the issue of the right to retain expert
witnesses ten years later (the same year it upheld the absolute
right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright'7 ) and this time avoided
the issue by remanding Bush v. Texas" to the highest state court
for decision. The problem falls, then, on lower federal and state
courts to reconcile the Baldi decision with the more recent holding
of a right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright. In grappling with
this problem, the courts have reached different results in deciding
whether there is a constitutional right to expert witnesses." Where
the court itself has called an expert, some courts have held that
there is no constitutional right to expert witnesses. They reason
that the state has no duty to promote the battle of experts by
financing expert witnesses for indigent defendants and that to hold
otherwise either would constitute judicial legislation"0 or would go
beyond the minimum requirements of due process.' Where the
court has not called any expert witnesses, 2 some courts have not
recognized a constitutional right and some have. Those that have
recognized such a right have based it on the constitutional guaran-
tees of due process," equal protection," right to counsel,55 and right
to compulsory process."8
Although the sixth amendment offers textual support for pro-
viding aid in addition to counsel, its application is limited to crimi-
nal cases. The equal-protection clause and the due-process clause
, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
372 U.S. 586 (1963).
" Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970).
" State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138,449 P.2d 603, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969).
, State v. Chapman, 365 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. 1963).
" See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 458, 409 P.2d 742 (1966);
Houghtaling v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 309, 163 S.E.2d 560, cert. denied, 394 U.S.
1021 (1968).
11 See, e.g., People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966); State v.
Taylor, 202 Kan. 202, 447 P.2d 806 (1968) (dicta).
" United States ex rel Robinson v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1965), off'd in
part and remanded in part on other grounds, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
'5 Ex parte Ochse, 38 Cal.2d 230, 231, 238 P.2d 561 (1951).
' Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1967).
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
[Vol. 80
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suggest other constitutional sources for the right to expert wit-
nesses in civil cases. The Court has relied on the equal-protection
clause in developing a firm commitment to equalizing access to
criminal courts." For indigent defendants, the Court has granted
free transcripts," waived access fees," and even imposed on the
states the financial burden created by the right to counsel." More-
over, the Court has apparently not been concerned with labels of
criminal and civil."2 In habeas corpus proceedings the Court has
waived access fees, 3 and in juvenile proceedings the Court has
upheld the right to court-appointed counsel.8 Civil cases recogniz-
ing the constitutional right to counsel, however, occur infrequently
because plaintiffs usually seek money damages in which case they
may hire an attorney on a contingent-fee basis."
Majority opinions seem to suggest that the appropriate in-
quiry under the equal-protection clause is merely whether the state
has made a distinction between rich and poor.6 If so, then preclud-
ing expert testimony because of a party's inability to pay would
seem to constitute a violation of equal protection since the state,
although not denying the right to expert testimony, has in effect
barred the exercise of that right where a plaintiff cannot afford to
pay an expert a reasonable fee. But the facts of the equal access
cases decided under this rationale indicate that the holdings go
beyond finding a rich-poor distinction. These cases must also in-
volve a fundamental right, such as the right to counsel or the writ
of habeas corpus.67
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
n See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).
11 See, e.g., Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971); Roberts v. LaVallee,
389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Lane v. Brown 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
11 See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S.
192 (1960); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
11 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Contra, Ross v. Moffit,
417 U.S. 600 (1974) (indigent criminal defendant denied court-appointed counsel
on discretionary review).
2 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961).
" See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Long v. District Court, 385
U.S. 192 (1966); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
" In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
" 81 HARv. L. Rv. 435, supra note 5, at 451.
" Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
81 HAzy. L. Rav. 435, supra note 5, at 437-38.
8
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In order to restrict the scope of constitutional protection,"8
Justice Harlan"9 proposed using the due-process clause rather than
the equal-protection clause so as to emphasize fundamental rights
and not differences in treatment between individuals." His argu-
ment prevailed in Boddie v. Connecticut7' where the Court
adopted a two-part test to explain its waiver of access fees. First,
the judicial process must offer the exclusive remedy.2 This part of
the test is easily met because the government does have an effec-
tive monopoly over the redress of grievances in an orderly fashion.73
Second, the right involved must qualify as fundamental.7
"[S]ince Boddie held that the right to a divorce was
'fundamental.' . . . almost every other kind of legally enforceable
right is also fundamental to our society."" The Court could read
Boddie as representing the doctrine of equal access to civil courts,7"
but subsequent decisions, although not overruling Boddie, re-
stricted Boddie to its facts."
Whether the court selects an equal-protection or a due-process
analysis with regard to equal-access cases,78 the basic issue remains
one of determining whether the right in question is fundamental.
In the past, economic rights such as discharge in bankruptcy,"
16 AM. JuR.2d Constitutional Law 490 (1964).
" See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259-66 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in result); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 33-39 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11 81 HIv. L. Ray. 435, supra note 5, at 439.
71 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
n Id. at 374.
n Meltzer v. LeCraw, 402 U.S. 954, 956 (1971) (denial of certiorari) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
1, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
7' Meltzer v. LeCraw, 402 U.S. 954, 957-58 (1971).
7, Id. at 958.
7 See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973); Lindsey v. Normot, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Meltzer v. LeCraw,
402 U.S. 954 (1971). Although the Boddie Court's approach to the problem of equal
access to civil courts has not been followed in subsequent decisions, Justice Doug-
las' penumbra analysis might allow the Court to reach the same result as in Boddie
but in contexts other than divorce. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
In Griswold, the right of privacy was found to be within the penumbras of the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. The right of access to the courts might
be found within the penumbra of the first amendment right "to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." See generally California Motor Transport Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
1' Note, Access to the Courts in Civil Cases: Extension of Boddie Refused, 3
CAP. U.L. REv. 115, 132-33 (1974).
7, United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
[Vol. 80
9
Lea: Expert Witnesses--Right to Pay Expert Witnesses on a Contingent-F
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1978
EXPERT WITNESSES
welfare payments,8" and housing81 have been held not to be funda-
mental, whereas many of the guarantees of the federal Bill of
Rights,"2 the writ of habeas corpus,u right to notice and hearing,
right to interstate travel," right to vote,8 right to privacy,8 right
to terminate pregnancy," and right to a divorceu have been held
to be fundamental rights. 8 That the Court proceeds with caution
in this area is best illustrated by the rare occasions on which it has
held a right to be fundamental: 0 in order to gain that status, the
right to expert witnesses must be "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty."'" Stated in those terms, the denial of expert wit-
nesses makes the fundamental right to a hearing a meaningless
ritual.1
One court, however, has rejected the argument that there is a
constitutional right to retain expert witnesses on a contingent-fee
basis. In Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 3 the plain-
tiffs sought treble damages in an antitrust action and had only
small individual stakes in the outcome of the litigation. The court
found this to be more -analogous to prior Supreme Court cases
involving economic rights than to cases involving fundamental
rights." Although the court refused to elevate the right to retain
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
s Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
' See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (guarantee against double
jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury); Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (right to counsel).
" Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. at
193.
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
0 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
N Although these rights have been termed fundamental, some rights are more
fundamental than others when balanced against one another. For example, first
amendment interests weigh more heavily in the balance than does the right to
privacy. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
" See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
'3 Contra, State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 458, 409 P.2d 742, 749 (1966);
but cf. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 615 (1974) (defendant had meaningful access
to courts although denied right to counsel on discretionary review).
554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293 (Nov. 1, 1977).
See text accompanying notes 79-91 supra.
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expert witnesses on a contingent-fee basis to a constitutional level,
it indicated some sympathy for the arguments: that such a right
would aid and encourage less affluent plaintiffs to bring merito-
rious claims; that cross examination would reveal an expert wit-
ness' financial arrangement with his party; and that many expert
witnesses would have an indirect stake in the outcome of the litiga-
tion either because they had an ongoing business relationship with
the plaintiffs or because they would not receive payment unless the
plaintiffs were successful. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, however, was not persuaded to invalidate the
disciplinary rule forbidding attorneys to "offer to pay, or to ac-
quiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent
upon . . . the outcome of the case.""5 The court also stated that
whether these arguments are sufficient to overcome the fear that
experts paid on a contingent-fee basis will perjure themselves is a
legislative decision. 6
If there is a valid constitutional right to retain expert wit-
nesses, recognition of that right would create financial implica-
tions for the courts, especially in the criminal area, where imposi-
tion of a duty on the states to appoint experts for indigent defen-
dants would constitute judicial legislation;" yet this did not pre-
vent the Court from imposing on the states a duty to appoint
counsel in criminal cases for indigent defendants. In the civil
area, the contingent-fee arrangement with expert witnesses would
allow the courts to reach the desired result without judicial legisla-
tion. It is not the role of the judiciary to redistribute wealth.
Although achieving economic equality in the courtroom is a lauda-
ble goal, it is an inachievable one in light of our system of private
enterprise.1' ® The wealthy defendant can hire the best attorney,
but the Court will not impose a duty on the states to finance this
service for indigents. Yet the Court could reconcile the theory of
private enterprise with the appointment of experts in criminal
cases by allowing the states to recoup"0 ' the fees as they do in cases
a ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 7-109(c).
,a Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 554 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293 (Nov. 1, 1977).
" Cf. 81 HARv. L. REv. 435, supra note 5, at 451 (appointment of attorney and
waiver of court fees).
* Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
* See Michelman, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969).
® State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 458, 409 P.2d 742, 746-49 (1966).
"' See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.665(1) (Supp. 1977) (the court may require
[Vol. 80
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where access fees have been waived' 2 and counsel has been ap-
pointed. 0'
The contingent-fee arrangement in civil cases has provided a
solution to the problem of the high cost of legal services and might
possibly meet with the same success if extended to cover expert
witness' fees. Although the right to counsel has been unequivocally
established, the constitutional right to expert witnesses remains
arguable until finally decided by the United States Supreme
Court. The prevalent belief in the necessity of expert witnesses, in
the absence of any constitutional right, however, should be suffi-
cient reason to endorse the contingent-fee contract.
Gale Reddie Lea
a convicted defendant to pay costs). W. VA. CODE § 62-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
provides:
A court of record may appoint counsel to assist an accused in criminal
cases at any time upon request . . . . In every case where the court
appoints counsel for the accused and the arcused presents an affidavit
showing that he cannot pay therefor, the attorney shall be paid for his
services and expenses . . . . The amount so paid, in the event the ac-
cused shall not prevail, shall be and constitute a judgment of said court
against the accused to be recovered as any other judgment for costs.
02 Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305 (1966).
113 Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
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